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One of the prominent issues during the 1992 presidential cam-
paign was abortion, in particular the federal government's role in fi-
nancing counseling activities that might promote it. In the Bush
Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services had
adopted a controversial regulation to withhold federal funds from any
family planning or other medical service that included counseling
about abortion in its activities;1 the Clinton campaign promised to re-
scind that regulation if Clinton were elected President.2 Shortly after
his election, in a prominent White House ceremony, President Clinton
announced that he had directed the rescission of the prior rule and the
initiation of a fresh rulemaking to consider the issue.3
As the 1996 campaign approached, teen-age smoking, and the
role of the tobacco companies in promoting it, emerged as a large
public issue. During the summer of 1995 the President announced
that he was directing the undertaking of a major rulemaking effort
to control the advertising and distribution of tobacco products to
minors;4 and in August of 1996 he announced the issuance of the
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. As often since he joined
my faculty, John Manning has been an invaluable reader and support. Thanks also to Lawrence
Lessig and to the other participants in this symposium-particularly to Cynthia Farina. Her
paper in this symposium, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997), paired with this one in the presentation, is complemen-
tary to this one. She persuades us to see government as a multi-voiced construct, so that assert-
ing that we have a unitary presidency in the strong sense would be a serious-and threatening-
category mistake. See id. at 987-89. The need for structural polyphony, as she argues, is if any-
thing stronger today than when it was the underlying motif of the framing. See id. at 1037-38.
1. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1996).
2. See Ruth Marcus, At Issue: Abortion; On Support for Choice and Limits, Bush-Clinton
Contrasts Are Sharp, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at A21, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wpost File.
3. See Memorandum on the Title X "Gag Rule", 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 22, 1993); Re-
marks on Signing Memorandums on Medical Research and Reproductive Health and an Ex-
change With Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 7 (Jan. 22, 1993). The Secretary of Health and Human
Services promptly acted as she had been directed, adopting one rule restoring the prior rule to
effect as an interim measure, see 58 Fed. Reg. 7468 (1993), and proposing a new rulemaking for a
permanent resolution. See 58 Fed. Reg. 7464 (1993). At this writing, no new rule has been
adopted, although the proposal appears regularly in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations.
See, e.g., Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 62 Fed. Reg. 21,662,
21,667 (1997).
4. See The President's News Conference, 1 Pua. PAPERS 1237 (Aug. 10, 1995) [hereinafter
Aug. 1995 News Conference].
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rule.5 While the voluminous rulemaking documents emerged from
the Food and Drug Administration, in which any authority to adopt
the rule had been statutorily placed,6 press releases called it the Presi-
dent's rule, 7 and President Clinton led the public relations effort to
announce its adoption, as he had its earlier proposal.
8
Another prominent health-and-safety issue of recent times has
concerned automobile air bags. While overall an important safety im-
provement, the current design of air bags has proved hazardous to
some automobile passengers-particularly infants riding in the front
seat of automobiles with passenger-side air bags, but also shorter driv-
ers, and people particularly susceptible to percussive events. Respon-
sibility for change in the current standard rests with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), a constituent
part of the Department of Transportation, and it has undertaken a
variety of rulemaking initiatives to deal with this problem.9 Again,
however, the President has stepped in front of the rulemaking effort
and, from a public relations/political perspective at least, taken it on as
his own. In Saturday radio addresses, it became his effort, one which
he had directed to assure safety, to protect our children, to end the
current hazard.10
If one examines the documents of the rulemakings themselves,
one gets little hint of this presidential overlay of political activity, as-
suming (and seeking) responsibility for an action that he presumably
believed would produce a net gain in public political affection for his
administration. The documents speak the usual mix of scientific and
legal justification for "expert" action undertaken in a contested public
policy space, to achieve statutory ends assigned to particular agencies
for implementation, and they scarcely allude to the President's partici-
5. See Remarks Announcing the Final Rule to Protect Youth From Tobacco, 32 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1490 (Aug. 23, 1996).
6. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless To-
bacco to Protect Children and Adolescents; Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (222 pages);
Annex: Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nico-
tine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determi-
nation, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (1996) (699 pages and requiring a separate book).
7. See, e.g., Aug. 1995 News Conference, supra note 4, at 1237.
8. See Remarks on the Initiative to Protect Youth From Tobacco, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 265 (Feb. 28, 1997).
9. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, Child
Restraint Systems, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,464 (1997) (interim final rule; request for comments) (modi-
fying air bag warning label); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protec-
tion, 62 Fed. Reg. 26,425 (1997) (interim final rule; request for comments) (depowering air bags
to protect children and small adults).
10. See, e.g., The President's Radio Address, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 196 (Feb. 24,
1997); The President's Radio Address, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1 (Jan. 6, 1997).
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pation.11 A person who had not been reading newspapers or listening
to presidential speeches would see only an ordinary (if high-visibility)
agency rule, adopted and defended in the ordinary manner. What the
courts will see on review, if they limit themselves to the rulemaking
record, will be, correspondingly, a quite ordinary collection of docu-
ments and voluminous explanations of expert judgment by the depart-
ments ostensibly concerned.
What the public is seeing is quite a different matter, actions that
are openly political and explicitly presidential. From their perspective
it is the President whose judgment underlies decisions to fund family
planning clinics even though they may counsel about abortion, and
who reached conclusions about the marketing of tobacco to minors or
the need to accommodate the general protections offered by airbags
to the particular risks they present for sub-groups exposed to them.
One can imagine, too, that the agencies, though observing the public
formalities of responsibility for these rulemakings, understand them as
the President's in a fairly strong sense.
While each of the last six Presidents has taken a strong interest in
the rules generated by the agencies of his administration, the proprie-
tary interest in particular outcomes that President Clinton has taken
in public political actions appears to be a new phenomenon. He has
made these "his" proceedings in the public eye, if not in formal docu-
mentary status, in ways I believe prior Presidents have not. We seem
to have come a long way from Justice Black's observation for the
Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that "the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker. 1 2 The question to which this essay is ad-
dressed is whether we have, in this emerging practice, any cause for
concern.
Doubtless, the President's willingness to take political responsi-
bility, even for generally popular rulemaking initiatives, reflects our
growing awareness and acceptance that rulemaking is not simply a
technocratic process performed in neutrality by objective experts;
rulemaking has a distinctly political cast, and that may make the Presi-
dent's actions seem even comforting. Yet, in my judgment, a simple
dichotomy between law and politics is a false one. What characterizes
government in these respects is a tension between the legal and the
11. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,464; Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards, 62 Fed. Reg. at 26,425.
12. 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
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political. This tension is one on the maintenance of which our polit-
ical society depends-and one which a strongly political, presiden-
tially centered view of rulemaking threatens to erode. The President's
practice, in my judgment, insufficiently respects the tension inherent
in the Constitution between Congress's power to create the instru-
ments of government and allocate authority among them and the fact
of a single chief executive at the head of the agencies thus created,
with intended and inevitable political relationships with all.
I. POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION
Perhaps the initial point is to remark that the developments just
described are not isolated. Rather they are part of what appears to be
a larger political-and perhaps intellectual-development in relation
to regulation, one that replaces a view of regulators as experts acting
in isolation from politics with one that acknowledges the politicality of
most if not all administrative policy choices. The emergence of
rulemaking as a major instrument of policy formulation with the envi-
ronmental, health, and safety regimes of the 1960s and 1970s doubt-
less helped fuel this change. As far back as John Quarles' Cleaning
Up America1 3 and the very earliest developments of environmental
impact statements, cost impact statements, and the like, the White
House had come to be deeply involved in important rulemakings.
Many administrative law scholars, perhaps most of us, saw in this in-
creasing presidential engagement a good thing. We applauded sixteen
years ago, when Judge Patricia Wald's influential and justly admired
Sierra Club v. Costle saw the possibility that presidential influence
may have shaped agency judgment in rulemaking, within the possibili-
ties open on the agency record, as an acceptable, even desirable, ele-
ment of the rulemaking process. 14 References to presidential
responsibility in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.15 seemed equally sensible and reassuring. 16 The Presi-
dent could be accountable to the people, and the agencies, through
13. JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING Up AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1976).
14. See 657 F.2d 298, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
15. See 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984).
16. For suggestions that it may even be constitutionally compelled, see Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995), and Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1997); acknowledg-
ing the development, Cynthia R. Farina has sounded a more skeptical note in The "Chief
Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 185 (1997), and




him, could be held accountable for policy judgments in ways that the
courts simply could not. The cost-benefit analysis requirements begun
in the early 1970s made their way through Executive Orders 12,04417
and 12,2911s to 12,86619 with general approval-thought legally unob-
jectionable and politically tolerated even under the conditions of di-
vided government that have generally prevailed during their
implementation.
Nor has only the President turned in this direction. Beginning
with the rapid growth and then failure in its use of the legislative veto,
Congress has with some consistency sought more active engagement
in agency policy formation. Congressional staff and oversight hours
kept pace with the explosion of Federal Register pages that the new
emphasis on rulemaking brought.20 Now, with the enactment of Sub-
title E of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996 ("SBREFA"), 21 every agency rule is to be laid before Congress
for possible enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval-a require-
ment imposed on the clear understanding that it will arm political en-
gagement by the Congress in rulemaking development, as agencies
seek to avoid the possible entanglements and frustrations of the reso-
lution-of-disapproval process.
22
The changing intellectual view has been interestingly sketched by
Professor Lawrence Lessig, drawing for these purposes on dicta in an
opinion Justice Antonin Scalia wrote while still sitting as a judge on
the District of Columbia Circuit. 23 At the beginning of this century,
Lessig recounts, "a growing adherence to scientism and professional-
ism in administrative law" 24 produced the belief that "much of the
'political' in administration could be removed and replaced by a
nonpolitical, expert-based bureaucracy, thereby improving the activist
17. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
18. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
19. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note
(1994).
20. From 1961 to 1981, Federal Register pages rose from 15,000 to 65,000, congressional
committee staff from under 1000 to 2500, and the number of oversight days quadrupled, to about
500. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 196-97 (9th ed. 1995) (reprinting tables from JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A
WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (1990)).
21. Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, §§ 251-53, 110 Stat. 847, 868-74 (to be codified at 5
U.S.C. § 801-08).
22. A joint resolution, which must be signed by the President or enacted over his veto, does
not present the immediate constitutional problems of the legislative veto, although the
SBREFA's mechanisms can be questioned in some of its details. See Daniel Cohen & Peter L.
Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 104-06 (1997).
23. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 433-34.
24. Id. at 433.
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regulatory state. If political scientists could replace politicians, the
thought went, truth could guide administration. '25 This was the idea,
he argues, that underlay the Supreme Court's holding in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States26 that Congress could constitutionally limit
the President's right to remove an FTC Commissioner to "cause."
The Court viewed Humphrey as an 'expert' exercising a technical,
rather than political, expertise. As an administrative officer,
Humphrey's job was to obey the law, not the president. It followed
that the president had no constitutional right to control Humphrey
in his duties insofar as those duties related to the policies of the
[Federal Trade Commission ("FFC")]. The statute, not the presi-
dent, determined FTC policy.27
But for contemporary observers, Lessig suggests beginning with a
quote from then-Judge Scalia, faith in scientific administration has
eroded:
It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930s that
there can be such things as genuinely "independent" regu-
latory agencies, bodies of impartial experts whose inde-
pendence from the President does not entail
correspondingly greater dependence upon the committees
of Congress to which they are then immediately accounta-
ble; or, indeed, that the decisions of such agencies so
clearly involve scientific judgment rather than political
choice that it is even theoretically desirable to insulate
them from the democratic process.
What Justice Scalia remarks here is a view about the very na-
ture of executive lawmaking .... At its core, the argument is that
administrative action ... cannot be understood in the neutral, scien-
tific, apolitical sense in which it was understood by the founders of
the administrative state. It is instead now seen by all to be essen-
tially 'political'-involving an essentially 'political choice.'
28
25. Id. (with a footnote after "regulatory state" as follows: "See, e.g., FRANK J. GOODNOW,
POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT (1900); see also Robert E.
Cushman, Book Review, 24 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 746 (1930); Ernest Freund, Book Review, 1 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 136 (1906) (reviewing POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION)."). See also Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
26. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
27. Lessig, supra note 16, at 434 (with a footnote after "political expertise" that quotes
Humphrey's Executor:
Thus, the language of the act, the legislative reports, and the general purposes of
the legislation as reflected by the debates, all combine to demonstrate the Congres-
sional intent to create a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of ser-
vice-a body which shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection,
and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or
any department of the government.
295 U.S. at 625-26).
28. ld. at 435 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C.) (per
curiam), aff d sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)). Another compelling contempo-
[Vol. 72:965
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The premise of Justice Scalia's view, note, is that administrative
action is either the one or the other-either the product of scientific
policymaking, or the product of politics, and not the product of uneasy
and shifting tensions between the two. If that is right, then the Presi-
dent's appropriation of these important rulemakings in the public's
eye is, at least from this perspective, unproblematic; it is simply a fur-
ther manifestation, like the SBREFA, of our growing appreciation of
rulemaking's political character. Yet, still another Supreme Court jus-
tice, also speaking while a circuit court judge, has eloquently argued
the claims of science and objectivity in recent years.29 One can be-
lieve, moreover, that the appearance and eventual acceptance of the
"scientism and professionalism" view towards the end of the last cen-
tury was not wholly independent of the politics of its times; the Civil
Service as well as the "independent regulatory commission" emerged
alongside progressivism, during years when concerns with political
corruption and machine politics gripped the nation, and such institu-
tions seemed a useful palliative. In truth, the science/politics duality is
only one of a number of "false pairs" one could identify, that appear
to suggest the possibility, if not the preferability, of a middle course.
A. POLITICS/politics
Our daily newspapers confront us repeatedly with evidence that
political controls still embody the potential for corruption-or its ap-
pearance, that provoked our search for alternatives-and that this po-
tential still drives the relationship between politicians and regulators.
Take, for example, President Clinton's press conference of January 28,
1997.30 A principal subject of inquiry there was the presence of the
Comptroller of the Currency, responsible for bank regulation, at a
political fundraiser also attended by banking officials, the President,
and the Comptroller's immediate superior, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury.31 Questioning turned to the appropriateness of their having cof-
fee at the White House with persons who were both generous political
donors and the subjects of banking regulation.32 For the President, it
was obvious that he could be at that coffee, and also that the Secretary
of Treasury could. Fund-raising is a fact of political life, for executive
rary view of this development is to be found in JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND Gov-
ERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).
29. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993).





branch as well as for legislative officials, and no one could think that
the President's act of meeting with important political donors could be
understood only as a form of corruption. (Well, one could think it,
but we forbid only the fact of bribery and-however we may feel
about it-not the business of raising political funds.) It was, however,
the President admitted, a mistake for the Comptroller, the regulatory
official, to be present.33 That mistake at first seemed likely to cost the
person who made it a promotion to cabinet status34-perhaps for nar-
rowly partisan reasons, but also with some grounding in established
expectations about official conduct.
The distinction, and the loss of face that turned on it, is credible
only if the duties and prerogatives of the two officials are different-
that is, if there are duties unique to the Comptroller, in which the
President does not share, and that must be kept apart from party
political interests. This is different from the question of tenure in of-
fice and irrespective of the President's formal control over the length
of an official's service. The Comptroller serves at the President's plea-
sure.35 If that means that the Comptroller takes no decision save as
33. See id.
34. On February 20, 1997, the President stated:
The only other comment I want to make today is there has still not been a hearing
scheduled for Alexis Herman. I think that is a big mistake. She enjoys wide support
among labor-the labor unions endorsed her yesterday strongly-and she has wide
support among business. I don't know that there's ever been a person nominated for
Secretary of Labor that had as much broad support in the business and the labor com-
munities. She's clearly well-qualified. If anybody wants to vote against her for
whatever reason, they're plainly free to do that, but she deserves a hearing, and if she
gets a hearing, she's going to be confirmed. And I think Senator Jeffords is a good man
and a fair man, and I believe he will give her a hearing. But it's imperative that it be
done. It's now midway through February and I think it's time to get on with this.
Remarks on Medicaid Patient Protection and an Exchange with Reporters, 33 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 218, 220 (Feb. 20, 1997). Ironically, these remarks were made at the end of a press
briefing called principally for a purpose like those discussed in the text, the President announc-
ing that he had:
direct[ed] Secretary Shalala to inform all state Medicaid directors that it's illegal for
health care plans to prohibit doctors from discussing any treatment options with their
patients. Families facing illness simply should not have to worry that the doctor they
trust does not have the freedom to tell them what they need to know. Patients have the
fundamental right to know they are getting the best medical treatment, not simply the
cheapest. And this must be only the beginning. We can act today to protect Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries because they are Federal programs and because Govern-
ment is the largest purchaser of managed care in our Nation. But to protect 130 million
Americans enrolled in managed care throughout the private sector, the Congress must
act.
Id. at 218-19. Once again, that is, the President had presented himself as the responsible
rulemaker.
Ms. Herman was finally confirmed in May, 1997. See Jerry Gray, After Impasse, Senate
Conforms Clinton's Choice for Labor Post, N.Y. TiMES, May 1, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File.
35. See 12 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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the President's proxy, that the President's political responsibilities re-
quire the conclusion that he must be able to substitute his judgment
for the Comptroller's as to any matter, the distinction being drawn is a
senseless one. It has substance only if we imagine that the Comptrol-
ler has independent (regulatory) duties, conferred by Congress, that
are inconsistent with political roles in ways the President's functions
or the functions of a cabinet Secretary are not. That means that it is
the Comptroller's right, and in some cases it may be his obligation, to
refuse the President's direction, even if he realizes that his disap-
pointed boss may immediately send him out of office. Should the
President decide to do so, and it is hardly inevitable that he will, he
will have to pay a political price for the confrontation. That is, in the
view of the public that might exact that political price, he is not enti-
tled simply to substitute his preference, or to pretend to the Comp-
troller that he has the right to do so. If they both understand that, it
shapes the character of the transactions between them.
36
The distinction here may seem an ineffable one, but it is at the
heart of our understandings about the borderline between law and
politics, and it was at the heart of one of the great political crises of
this century.37 When Richard Nixon grew displeased with the direc-
tion Archibald Cox's Watergate investigation was taking, he did not
act as if he could himself dismiss that important federal official. He
did not so act even though the issue arose before enactment of the
Independent Counsel statute38 that the incident catalyzed. (Mr. Cox
was simply an officer of the Department of Justice, whose tenure and
responsibilities were fixed not by a statute but by a departmental reg-
ulation. 39) Rather, he asked his Attorney General to fire Cox. Were
the Attorney General merely the mouthpiece of the President, with
no independent duties of his own-had he seen himself in this way-it
is hard to imagine that what we know to have happened would have
happened. Not one but two persons acting as Attorney General re-
fused to take the action the President sought. To be sure, they re-
36. Both the long-standing character of congressional arrangements seeking relative inde-
pendence for officials concerned with the money supply and the legal and policy justifications for
those arrangements are well developed in Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 27-31, 78, 107.
37. For an account of the events of the Watergate Saturday Night Massacre, see JAMES
DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE BATTLE OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS Cox AND JAWORSKI
186-202 (1977).
38. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99
(1994)).
39. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 (1974); Office of Watergate Special Prose-
cution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 32,805 (1973); Establishing the Office of Watergate Special Prosecu-
tion Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 30,738 (1973).
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signed; the President eventually found an acting Attorney General
who would take the requested step.40 The distinction was nonetheless
made and enforced, and it had an inescapably tangible influence.
Whether we consider events attending the dismissal of Archibald Cox
to have reflected the President's right to fire a cabinet officer at will,
or as the embodiment of a cabinet officer's moral obligation to resign
when he cannot act as the President wishes, we can see what they do
not reflect. They are sharply inconsistent with the proposition that the
President's sole possession of constitutional "executive power" means
that any responsibility assigned to an executive department is his, and
that he may exercise it. Had Attorney General Richardson or Acting
Attorney General Ruckleshaus believed that to have been the legal
situation, their situation would have been much easier. It is far easier
to act as a servant, than as an independent authority under instruc-
tions from one's principal.
Yet the issues in the Saturday Night Massacre or the independent
counsel statute involve executive action simpliciter, the setting in
which the argument from the President's political responsibility to his
authority to act directly is the strongest. The same understanding has
figured, as well, in discussions of presidential interventions in
rulemaking. Thus, in applauding the possibility of presidential polit-
ical oversight of rulemaking in her influential Sierra Club opinion,
Judge Wald sounded one note of caution: that the facts before her
made it unnecessary to decide the effect upon a rulemaking "of a fail-
ure to disclose so-called 'conduit' communications, in which adminis-
tration or inter-agency contacts serve as mere conduits for private
parties in order to get the latter's off-the-record views into the pro-
ceeding. '41 Department of Justice lawyers, she noted, had "taken the
position that it may be improper for White House advisers to act as
conduits for outsiders. '42
In the years following, constant struggles between the White
House and Congress over the economic impact analysis procedure,
and much of the literature following it, 4 3 followed the same line: The
40. Only, it seems important to stress, after the fact of two resignations had already made
evident the terrible political price the President would pay for his action and after the number of
departmental officials who might ever have been prepared to act as Attorney General in normal
course, under the provisions made for succession to acting status, see 28 U.S.C. § 508 (1994), had
been cut to one.
41. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 n.520 (D.C. Cit. 1981).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") in
rulemaking review was to be exercised in significant political isolation,
with its professional staff protected from contact with political opera-
tives and communications between it and the agencies subject to a
degree of publicity quite unusual for White House communications as
a whole. At the same time as we acknowledge the political character-
istics of rulemaking and the values of political responsibility for its
outcomes, we treat as the stuff of scandal and impropriety news that
political operatives, congressional or executive, have been seeking fa-
vors for their friends. Public outcry over Political Action Committees
and campaign contributions, over phone calls, coincidences, and pres-
sures, walks hand in glove with general approval of policy oversight by
Congress and President both.
44
B. DISCRETION/discretion
The issues under discussion here, in my judgment, turn impor-
tantly on our understanding of the idea of discretion, an idea that
figures also in later papers. The contrast I want to draw is like the one
Professor Rubin suggests between two sorts of discretion under law,
which he characterizes as "weak" and "strong," and a "super-strong"
discretion that is beyond legal controls. 45 He appears to argue that
super-strong discretion is illegitimate in our system. In my judgment
that is true only within the policy-making bureaucracy of rulemaking
and other ordinary administrative behavior, and the contrast under-
scores the difficulties of the strong presidency idea. The problem is
set by a misleading dichotomy drawn by the great Chief Justice in
Marbury v. Madison,46 the foundation stone of so much of our consti-
tutional jurisprudence.
In justifying the Court's authority to command an executive
branch officer to act in some settings, Chief Justice Marshall drew the
ancient distinction between discretion and ministerial duty in these
terms:
44. That the issue does not concern only the President, consider, for example, a news report
of February 21, 1997, that the Republican National Committee had been promising significant
contact with Members of Congress in return for $25,000 contributions from corporate donors.
See Peter Overby, Political Double Standard, Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast,
Feb. 21, 1997), transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, NPR File (reporting on Congres-
sional Republicans who criticize the Clinton administration for selling access to the White
House, while themselves appearing to sell access to their own campaign contributors).
45. Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and it Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997).
46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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By the constitution of the United States, the President is in-
vested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid
him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint
certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his
orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may
be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be
used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discre-
tion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not indi-
vidual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of
the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be
perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the
department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were pre-
scribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the Presi-
dent. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The
acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the
courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer
other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain
acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the perform-
ance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to
the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the
vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive,
merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases
in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law,
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself in-
jured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.47
The striking characteristic of this passage is that, in distinguishing
so sharply between the worlds of politics (discretion) and law, Chief
Justice Marshall wholly omits the world of regulation. In the world of
politics-the example given is that of the Secretary of State acting in
foreign relations-the Secretary "is the mere organ by whom [the
President's] will is communicated," and "nothing can be more per-
fectly clear than that [her] acts are only politically examinable." In
the contrasting world he imagines, the world of law, "the legislature"
directs an officer "peremptorily to perform certain acts"-in the case
before him to deliver a signed commission of office. Thus, it is the
absence of any expectation of external legal controls that arms Justice
47. Id. at 165-66.
[Vol. 72:965
PRESIDENTIAL RULEMAKING
Marshall's Marbury distinction. As Henry Monaghan, among others,
has pointed out, the idea of "discretion" in Marbury is different from
the one we associate with the administrative state.48 All of Justice
Marshall's Marbury examples involved discretion as a political ques-
tion, discretion the abuse of which is beyond judicial office to ex-
amine, "only politically examinable." Marshall's distinction,
moreover, has the same sharp-edged, either/or characteristic as the
earlier-quoted passage from Justice Scalia, discussed by Professor
Lessig.4
9
The clarity of this contrast tends to obscure the vast middle
ground that is the home of administrative law and of the question
under discussion here. Once we acknowledge the possibility of con-
gressional delegation of, say, rulemaking authority to be exercised
within bounds defined (however imperfectly) by law, we have placed
ourselves into what is for these purposes a conundrum. In rulemaking
or other exercises of delegated authority, we say that Congress has
permissibly delegated authority to act, because we say that courts and
others are in a position to tell whether or not the delegate has acted in
accordance with law. We do not ask that of the Secretary of State's
exercise of DISCRETION, which was Marshall's "political question"
point; there, Professor Rubin's "superstrong" discretion lives.
Yet the exercise of administrative discretion we take as a different
matter entirely. On the one hand, we accept the delegation because,
we say, a court is able to say whether or not the agency has acted
within its authority under the law; if we thought a court could not
make that judgment, that there was no law to apply, we might quickly
conclude that an improper delegation had occurred. In that respect,
we can characterize the act of administering the law as, in a relevant
sense, ministerial-not because one believes that there is no discretion
in executing such a law, but rather because it is authority that can be
placed in an agency ("minister"), and because Congress has provided
instructions we accept as adequate to say whether the agency is acting
lawfully or not. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that the
scope of this discretion may be very large-that the Court has dis-
claimed standards for assessing whether Congress has made the most
48. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1983); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 55-61 (suggesting that, in constitutional contempla-
tion, only certain types of departments-State, for example-were imagined as "political," and
that it was this understanding on which Marshall was drawing).
49. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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important political decisions or not50 and even in some sense cele-
brated the possibility that it will fail to do so.51 That is what arms the
argument for political controls; as we see that in fact agencies are not
simply "finding" the policy of the law in the statute, but to a signifi-
cant degree "making" the policy of the law from their own views, then
the need for presidential engagement becomes stronger.
The problem on the regulatory middle ground, then, is far more
complex than Chief Justice Marshall's contrast between setting for-
eign policy and delivering a signed piece of paper. In the context of
agency rulemaking, the question whether Congress will have done
enough to make an agency's judgments "ministerial" (i.e., in these
terms, acceptable if made by ministers rather than the President) is
indistinguishable from the question whether Congress decided enough
when it required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") to assure "to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment
of health or functional capacity even if [regularly exposed to a toxic
substance] for the period of his working life," without setting a value
on human life.5 2 Why the President can be kept from controlling the
exercise of this discretion directly, as why the Comptroller ought not
to have been at that reception, inheres in Congress's power to set law
for administration.
To put the issue in terms of the notorious puzzle set by
§§ 701(a)(2) 53 and 706(2)(A) 54 of the Administrative Procedure Act:
for the Secretary of State, judicial review of discretion is explicitly for-
bidden; for the rulemaker, judges are told to determine whether
agency discretion has been abused. To conclude that the legality of a
rulemaking in a given case was a "political question," beyond reach of
50. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393, 416 (1989) (majority and dissent).
51. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-
66 (1984).
52. See § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (1994) (containing quoted language); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (interpreting § 6(b)(5) of OSH Act). In Justice
Rehnquist's concurring view, § 6(b)(5) constituted an unlawful delegation precisely because it
failed adequately to instruct the Secretary of Labor how to calculate the need for action. See
Benzene, 448 U.S. at 671-88.
53. "This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that... agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a), (a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
54. "The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (emphasis supplied).
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the courts, would be to conclude (if rulemaking were involved) that an
unlawful delegation had taken place.
55
C. TYRANT/clerk
Another way to see this issue, in my judgment, is to understand
the ambivalence of Article II about the President's authority, and the
reasons for it so well captured by Edward Corwin:
Suppose ... that the law casts a duty upon a subordinate execu-
tive agency eo nomine, does the President thereupon become enti-
tled, by virtue of his "executive power" or of his duty to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," to substitute his judgment for
that of the agency regarding the discharge of such duty? An un-
qualified answer to this question would invite startling results. An
affirmative answer would make all questions of law enforcement
questions of discretion, the discretion moreover of an independent
and legally uncontrollable branch of the government. By the same
token, it would render it impossible for Congress, notwithstanding
its broad powers under the "necessary and proper" clause, to leave
anything to the specially trained judgment of a subordinate execu-
tive official with any assurance that his discretion would not be per-
verted to political ends for the advantage of the administration in
power. At the same time, a flatly negative answer would hold out
consequences equally unwelcome. It would, as Attorney General
Cushing quaintly phrased it, leave it open to Congress so to divide
and transfer "the executive power" by statute as to change the gov-
ernment "into a parliamentary despotism like that of Venezuela or
Great Britain with a nominal executive chief or president, who,
however, would remain without a shred of actual power."'56
The words of Article II of the Constitution reflect the same am-
bivalence and tension; we have opted for neither a tyrant nor a clerk,
and the tension in our choice is captured in the idea of a single Presi-
dent, whose role in relation to domestic government, however, Con-
gress may confine to oversight. On the one hand, as those supporting
the idea of a strong, unitary presidency often remark, Article II begins
by vesting "[t]he executive Power ...in a President of the United
States. ' 57 "[T]his does not mean some of the executive power, but all
of the executive power."'58 On the other, it refers to "Duties" imposed
55. The statement in the text concerns grants of rulemaking authority; executive authority
to choose priorities for action or to exercise management controls over the business of U.S.
federal government raise different issues. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993); Webster
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
56. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 80-81 (4th
rev. ed. 1957).
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
58. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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on "the principal Officer[s] in each of the executive Departments. '59
It says of the President in relation to those officials only that he may
appoint them and demand of them their "Opinion[s], in writing" on
the matters for which they are made responsible. 60 Moreover, by
making those appointments turn on the Senate's Advice and Consent,
it creates the likelihood that those Officers will feel some political re-
sponsibility to Congress, and will be nominated with a view to the
Senate's likely view of the qualities needed to carry out the particular
duties of their offices. 61 Finally, rather than directing the President
(himself) faithfully to execute the laws, it says that "he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed" 62-as if to say, executed by those
in whom the Senate, as well as he, has expressed its confidence. 63 Just
how our government should be organized below the level of Congress,
President, and Court was explicitly left in Congress's hands, under a
Necessary and Proper Clause whose diction, perhaps carelessly but
nonetheless tellingly, imagines "Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion... in any Department or Officer. ' 64 In more than two hundred
years, just about the only proposition we know to have been clearly
established about the President's power in domestic governance-and
that by only a single vote in the Senate 65 and two in the Court
66 -is
that the Congress cannot reserve for itself participation in the dis-
charge of an Officer of the United States.
67
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
60. Id.
61. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705. This responsibility is revealed sometimes dramatically, as
in the promise made by Elliot L. Richardson when confirmed as Attorney General that he would
appoint a special prosecutor to investigate President Nixon, see Nomination of Elliot L. Richard-
son to be Attorney General, 93d Cong. 143-44 (1973), and sometimes contextually as in the un-
dertakings about environmental law administration clearly understood when William
Ruckleshaus, a person with established environmentalist credentials, succeeded Anne Gorsuch
Burford as President Reagan's second administrator of the EPA. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big
Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 40
n.205 (1994); see also, Seth Schiesel, At FC.C. Confirmation Hearings, Emphasis Will Be on
Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1997, at D1, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File
(describing compromises made between the White House and the Senate prior to confirmation
hearings for nominees to the Federal Communications Commission).
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
63. Cf Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 61-70.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
65. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 84 n.334 (on the Senate's attempted impeach-
ment of Andrew Johnson for having removed the Secretary of War despite the Tenure of Office
Act).
66. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
67. See id. at 174-76. This is not the place to revisit the extended debate about "for cause"
removal, that seems to have been settled for the time being by the Court's decision in Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). If one supposes, however, as I do, that "for cause" must include
discipline for insubordination, Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 614-15 (1984), one quickly enough
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II. DELEGATION AND THE PRESIDENT
It is at this point that we return to the question of regarding dele-
gations of rulemaking authority to regulatory agencies as though they
were delegations to the President. Rulemaking by the Executive
Branch and by the independent regulatory agencies (imagining for the
moment that they are somehow apart from the Executive Branch
although responsible for the execution of a number of important stat-
utory regimes) 68 is deeply embedded in our working Constitution. We
have not doubted that executive officials can be lawmakers, in the
strongest sense, at least since 1905, when the Court in United States v.
Grimaud upheld the Secretary of Agriculture's enforcement of a rule
making it an offense to graze sheep in national forests without a per-
mit.69 The Secretary had adopted the rule under broad authority to
make rules providing for the management of public lands.70 We have
reached similar conclusions whether rulemakers have been independ-
ent agencies or (as for the Comptroller or the Secretary of Agriculture
in Grimaud) executive officials simpliciter. They may act as
rulemakers precisely because courts are able to say that their discre-
tion-to make rules or to perform any other executive function-is
exercised within a framework of law.
For the President, the rulemaking picture has been a good deal
more clouded. Among the more prominent early vindications of con-
gressional delegation were several involving delegations to the Presi-
dent in propria persona.71 These were, however, grants of authority to
take expedient actions touching on foreign relations concerns-to
deal with retaliatory tariffs, and the like. In approving them, the
Court satisfied itself with the formal observations that the President
was doing no more than declaring a contingency defined by Con-
gress, 72 or that he was acting within a relatively limited framework of
defined authority.73 While no realist could deny that the effect of the
sees how its invocation triggers both political and legal processes that will constrain presidential
action. He must articulate a reason. That process may be subject to judicial review, in itself.
And in any event it will arm a political process, both the public reaction to the dismissal and the
need to obtain Senate approval of a replacement. Thus, again, one sees how the very fact of
imagining duty and oversight as separate works to tame the politicality of administration. Cf.
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 110-113.
68. See Strauss, supra note 67.
69. 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911).
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649 (1892); The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
72. See Field, 143 U.S. 649 (retaliatory tariffs); The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. 382 (neutrality).
73. See Hampton & Co., 276 U.S. 394 (variation of tariffs).
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Presidential actions thus authorized was indistinguishable from legis-
lation in either the generality of its effect or the character of the judg-
ments made, we can see today that the very involvement of delicate
considerations of foreign relations, with trade wars or worse hanging
in the balance, brought their subject matter near to the President's
DISCRETION-and that could explain the Court's easy acceptance
of them. The setting is one demanding prompt and nuanced response
by one who can act for the nation in the international sphere. Today,
certainly, we imagine an inherent arena for presidential action-more
discretion and less structure provided by "law"-where such issues
are concerned.
The two cases in which the Court most prominently invoked the
delegation doctrine to defeat congressional legislation, however, each
also involved presidential action.74 On at least two subsequent occa-
sions, where the President himself had undertaken to make "law"
bearing on a dispute before the Court, the Court expressed in strong
terms its doubt of his authority to do so-first, in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer where the majority emphatically observed that,
"[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully enforced refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker"; 75 and again several decades later, in Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, where in the face of a well-established regime established
under Executive Order to regulate defense contracting, the Court ob-
served that rules must be the "the product of a congressional grant of
legislative authority. '76 Even if these observations do not preclude
Presidential rulemaking under a discrete and pointed conferral of au-
thority upon him directly, they do insist that the source of his author-
ity must be in the law.77 The Court's decision last term in Loving v.
United States,78 announced after this Symposium was held, well fits
this pattern. Rulemaking authority was directly conferred and sup-
ported by the President's constitutional responsibilities as Com-
mander in Chief.
79
74. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
75. 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
76. 441 U.S. 281, 302-04 (1979); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322,
reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 83 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
77. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1993).
78. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996).
79. See id. at 1751.
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A particularly thoughtful approach to this issue appears in Todd
Rakoff's persuasive analysis of Schechter Poultry,80 the Supreme
Court's least problematic invocation of the delegation doctrine.81
What distinguishes that delegation from most the Court approved,
before and after, Rakoff argues, is the fact that it had been made, in
effect, to the President, and that it swept across the whole range of
regulation.
8 2
The central focus of this argument is on the element of assuring
the legality of governmental behavior and the dispersal of power-the
only aspects of the delegation idea that courts have shown any disposi-
tion to address. From the perspective simply of political responsibil-
ity, which is also a concern of the delegation idea, the President
appears to be a superior rulemaker to an agency, because he can be
held directly accountable at the polls. Placing sweeping [quasi-]legisla-
tive authority in the hands of an actor himself at the apex of govern-
mental authority, however, raises considerations quite distinct from
those we face when an agency is empowered to act in a limited frame
of government, and in relation with not only the President but also
Congress and the courts. The President as lawmaker is more hazard-
ous than the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") as lawmaker,
precisely because he is omnicompetent, remote from effective check
by courts or even Congress. The embeddedness of the EPA, its focus
and its relations with multiple, organizationally superior overseers,
gives us the practical assurance that it will not run out of control. Dis-
persion of power, on Rakoff's argument, is the trumping considera-
tion. The agency's rulemaking is preferred (indeed, tolerated) despite
its diminished political responsibility just because it is not omnicom-
petent, because it exists embedded in relationships with Congress and
the courts as well as the White House. Legislative authority is as-
signed to the Congress. Indeed, when we think about the "agency" of
agencies in rulemaking, we instinctively refer that relationship to Con-
gress-they are congressional delegates-tending to obscure from
ourselves that they actually exist in a subordinate relationship to all
three branches of our government. That is the proposition that cannot
easily be advanced about the President. That we cannot easily make it
is what makes his participation as a rulemaker disturbing.
80. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
81. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the American Administrative State, 11 TEL
Aviv U. STUD. IN L. 9 (1992).




Hence, my conclusion is that the President is simply in error and
disserves the democracy he leads when he behaves as if rulemakings
were his rulemakings. The delegations of authority that permit
rulemaking are ordinarily made to others, not him-to agency heads
whose limited field of action and embeddedness in a multi-voiced
framework of legislature, President, and court are the very tokens of
their acceptability in a culture of law. Where Congress has placed the
statutory duty in the Administrator of the EPA, or the Secretary of
Labor, one could say it has delegated rulemaking power to the Presi-
dent only if that were the necessary constitutional consequence of its
choice. That proposition does not live in the cases or in the Constitu-
tion's ambiguous text. In the text both of the Constitution and of
Congress's statutes, it is the heads of departments who have legal du-
ties vis A vis regulatory law. The President can ask about those duties
and see that they are faithfully performed, but he and his department
heads are to understand that the duties themselves are theirs-if not
"ministerial," in Marshall's sense, they are emphatically not matters
"only politically examinable." Indeed, even the President's political
controls will be shaped by that allocation of duty, and by his conse-
quent knowledge that however free he may seem to be to remove an
incumbent and appoint a substitute officer more willing to do his bid-
ding, that result will turn on his ability to get his new nominee
confirmed.
The President's public behavior suggesting that agency rules are
his rules threatens to make us forget just this middle ground. It invites
us to give up the constraints of law in favor of those of politics. While,
from a political perspective, one can applaud a President who goes out
of his way to take responsibility as well as credit for the policy judg-
ments of his administration, this seems a high price to pay. To be sure,
agency process, perhaps particularly rulemaking process, is increas-
ingly seen as political rather than expert; that perception, in its way,
has animated the recent apparent revival of interest in "delegation,"
and other respects in which political elements of the Constitution's
structural arrangements have become prominent. 83 And for those to
whom the Constitution itself requires that any power granted by Con-
gress to the Executive branch be directly exercisable by the President
83. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (turning on an understanding of
the political controls implicit in the Constitution's arrangements respecting the power of ap-
pointment to federal office).
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himself,84 direct presidential rulemaking may seem even a constitu-
tional necessity. Yet, as seen, the text of the Constitution settles no
more than that the President is to be the overseer of executive govern-
ment, and-as Corwin's account 85 and the struggles over even the
milder presidential roles staked out to date must suggest-the con-
tours and extent of present-day government make a stronger reading
unacceptably hazardous to the public health. If we accept that
rulemaking is irreducibly political in some respects, we imagine com-
ponents of expertise as well; otherwise we would not be fighting as
hard as we do over proper elements of risk analysis-the best means
for identifying and managing uncertainties about complex technical
facts, and so forth. The issue is mediating between politics and law-
recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of each and finding ways of
promoting their proper contribution-rather than pretending to lo-
cate the practice at either pole.
One kind of presidential response, perhaps implicit in paper trails
that track the laws' assignments of responsibility, is that, in acting as
he has been, President Clinton has in fact not been displacing the ap-
paratus of government but simply voicing its results-that of course
an air bags rule will be the product of the informed analysis of the
NHTSA's staff or a tobacco rule of the FDA's-but that in associating
himself with these outcomes he simply acknowledges the responsibil-
ity the people would hold him to in any event. These are his bureau-
crats, and it is politically useful to both government morale and citizen
appreciation for the President to associate himself with regulatory
outcomes in this way. Yet this argument, in my judgment, really does
put us into the thick of the law/politics problem. It elides Congress's
constitutional prerogatives in structuring government, the duties it
may confer on Heads of Departments who are not the President
although they operate within the framework of the President's respon-
sibility to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed. For him to
make the bureaucrats believe that they are his is precisely to tear
down the structures of law and regularity Congress has built up in
relation to the presidency. It is Congress that gets to say how many
people work in the White House, how many in the Department of
Labor, how many in political offices, how many in the Senior Execu-
tive Service. In the current brouhaha about political fund-raising and
84. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Changing Images of the State: The Rise and Rise of the Adminis-
trative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
85. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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use of the White House, we see both the importance of formal lines
(i.e., the proposition that the White House may not be used as the site
of political fund-raising) and the erosive effects of their repeated test-
ing. The lines that are the focus of this commentary are of equal, and
not unrelated, consequence.
This is, of course, a formal argument. It accepts the variety of
political ways in which the President and those immediately around
him chivvy in rulemaking, from the formal apparatus of Executive Or-
der 12,866 to the informal checking and massaging that inevitably oc-
cur. The President in this respect is not too different from individual
members of Congress and committees who may equally attempt to
impress on administrative actors their views and the importance of
respecting them in their discretionary activities. He is, to be sure, our
chief executive, the one our Constitution has invested with executive
power; but he wields that power, in these respects, within the con-
straints of law that Congress has established. No more than he could
assign to the Secretary of the Interior responsibilities Congress had
placed in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture but he thought
could be more capably met on F Street, can he depart from Congress's
other assignments of responsibility. The bureaucrat or political ap-
pointee confronted by presidential chivvying can perhaps more easily
see in this perspective the tension between duty and advice, grasp the
limits on the President's capacity to understand and act on what may
be quite complex technical matters with a sparse and largely political
staff. The stakes for the psychology of government, for the extent to
which civil servants and political appointees imagine themselves act-
ing within a culture of law, are rather high.
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